How does ISIL manage its wars?

How does ISIL manage its wars?

Some important key notes regarding the developments on war against ISIL and ISIL’s ideology:

1- “The Land” is “the most essential component in the state formation, without a land, there is no state”.
Land is considered an essential corner stone in the terror groups and militias’ ideology and it is the essence of its existence. Since the declaration of the Islamic state, terrorization, lone wolf attacks and intimidation phase is now over. the declaration is not just an ad break, but is a declaration of reaching a new phase of Jihad that all Jihadis and Muslims all over the world were waiting to reach. before that, all what those groups have to offer was developing their tactics to guarantee the continuation of Jihad as the main goal, further more, it is the only and single goal of all caliphate and Islamic regimes, old, modern and new. And for “Jihad” to continue, there must be “a land” to claim and hold on to, and it is a direct correlation; holding the land means the continuation of Jihad and upon this, many have answered the caliph’s call to Jihad and joined “the land of jihad” “the land of the caliphate”. They would not have joined if their was not a strong sentiment of the existence of the land.

2- Within a year and a half, ISIL lost swaths of land it used to control, and that threatens the whole caliphate idea, which leads to shrinking in the numbers of new recruits, the defeat of the “rising caliphate”, weakness within ISIL internal ranks, specially most of its leaders were killed according to security and intelligence experts, the only first line leaders left are Albaghdadi and Aladnani, which it means that ISIL has to move to a new phase.

3- The rise of new terror groups describing their selves as “moderate” groups in Syria trying to take over ISIL , and that is the greatest challenge for ISIL, even greater than the coalition or countries like iraq, Syria, Iran, Turkey and GCC, because those groups were born with the same ideology as ISIL. It is the brothers’ conflict as they know how to play the same game very well, and that is the reason why ISIL fears them the most and always focuses its hits on them, along with that, Alqaeda, which is still strong and present in the mass mind, is another challenge for ISIL to face. Where in Iraq, the Sunnis are the most significant danger that ISIL faces in case they officially join the coalition to fight it. The Sunni conflict with ISIL is a conflict over faith and shari’a domination, and no one matches ISIL in this conflict more than the Sunnis themselves. ISIL is aware of the reasons behind the call to arm and mobilize the Sunnis, therefore, ISIL is hitting them hard at their cities “Mosul, Tikrit, Ramadi” and always trying to target them or to contain them and implicate the Sunnis with it.

4- More land loses for ISIL means loosing more resources that funds “the Caliphate”. ISIL is very keen about its resources, especially oil, and that means it has its impact on ISIL’s wars and its fighters, as it has thousands of fighters which all their needs, their weaponry, manufacturing, training, and development represent a dire demand for it to meet.

Now, what is the scenario? And how it would be accomplished and why is it the one single solution on the table for now?

1- The coalition needs to deal with ISIL with a “containment” strategy: to contain ISIL in one limited geographical location in Iraq and Syria and skirmish them quietly.

2- For ISIL accepts this idea and see its importance for it survival, and that is very likely what is happening. ISIL now is trying to draw its geographical boundaries and control its resources within its boundaries. ISIL also is working, and quickly, on preparing a new generation that strongly believes in the caliphate, a generation that never cares about war, but more about the concept of the caliphate itself. A generation that is deeply indoctrinated that will turn them into fuel to protect the lands ISIL controls. Also, ISIL is adopting the “vital range”, and that is, to push away the danger from the “settled lands” that is currently controlling, those are the “empowerment and stability” lands, like Mosul and Raqqa and the like, and the roads that connect them together, and ISIL’s attempts to create North Western borders to its territory.

3- ISIL is trying to stop waging major battles and only work on small wars of attrition, like what is happening in Ramadi, Tikrit, Baiji and Kurdistan. This is the current strategy that ISIL is following nowadays.

4- Lengthening the war. ISIL is not after victory, and will not allow any party to win victoriously. All what ISIL is doing is to keep the current status quo, and escalates it at times, then return it back at a level ISIL determines it for its enemies.

5- Opening a conflict front between the Sunnis, the Shiits and the Kurds at the hot zones, which buys ISIL more time and strength. The indicators from Iraq shows that all parties are at a turning corner, and if they fail to take defiant decisions that put them together and put fighting ISIL on top of their priorities, they will loose all together and ISIL wins the war.

6- ISIL uses the same tactics regarding tribe’s, the same tactics used by the founding Fathers of the caliphate, like the Umayyads the Abbasids in distributing the tribes and their significance. ISIL keeps close those tribes who intertwine with the Kurds and gives them very wide range of terms of reference to govern their selves, which it means, in return, a free defense for ISIL’s territories.


The First Gulf War, a quarter of a century after, What lessons have we learned?

The First Gulf War, a quarter of a century after

What lessons have we learned?

A few days ago, the memory of the first gulf war dawned on us, some of you remembered it, and some just passed by them. But for us as Iraqis, it is a memory that was a turning point in Iraq’s modern history.

Reviewing the modern history of Iraq gives us a transparent notion about the nature of governments ruled it. Some countries go to war for peace, or may be they are forced to fight wars because of mad conflicts amongst parties within their political system, then they regret going to war and bounce back to substitute war with peace for their people. Many countries over the course of history have suffered from war, but at the same time, they managed to develop an effective political and economical systems that kept them immune to wars.

As for Iraq, its experiences of war were nothing but a throwback. We could not come up with a rational perception to prevent maniacs from accessing any power. Saddam Hussein, the greatest maniac, left us with other maniacs, who all they care for is waging wars and trap the country in the conflicts rut over and over. Examples of Saddam were later repeated after liberating Iraq, will we continue producing it after we win over ISIL?

Some food for thought: Are we, the Iraqis, capable of constructing a political and economic system that will help depriving such examples of any access to power?
What is the role of the educated elite and the population in building a futuristic Iraq?
Do you have a vivid vision of the future and the shape of Iraq 10 years from now?


The great Iraqi crisis: Why there is no unanimous Sunni well to fight ISIL?

The great Iraqi crisis
Why there is no unanimous Sunni well to fight ISIL?


1- The Iraqi crisis:
The three parties and their priorities:
The straggle is not determined by ISIL alone, there are other conflicts far more important to all the conflict parties:

#TheKurds : The Kurds do not see ISIL as a direct threat to their canton. There are fundamental points of disagreement with the central government in Baghdad that shapes the conflict, and they are far more important to the Kurds than ISIL. Their lands are not under ISIL’s control and the existence of a strong military force that prevents ISIL advancement to Kurdistan makes them to look after what is more important for them, and that is their share of Iraq’s resources and to equally govern the country with Baghdad economically and geographically.

#TheShiit see fighting ISIL is a priority because it forms an existential threat to their existence and power in Iraq, for ISIL is not only an influential and military threat, but also as an ideological threat, the Sunni fundamentalism against Shiism. And because ISIL’s speech, in general, threatens the Shi’a, its conflict with the Shi’a is a conflict of dogma, values, culture and geography as well, which makes it a conflict that could go on for centuries and consumes every single detail in the history of both sects. Therefore, it is a must for the Shi’a to fight ISIL until they reach an ultimatum, either ISIL or the Shi’a. As ISIL was a response to a religious call “the caliphate”, so is the people’s mobilization units” was in response to the religious call of “Collective Jihad Duty”.

#TheSunnis : With their lack in political representation, weakness of administration, unable to set priorities, the Sunnis find in proofing their political and geographical existence is more important that just fighting ISIL and the annihilation of ISIL and termination of ISIL in the meantime is the major priority for them. Their conflict with the Kurds geographically makes them delaying their decision. The Sunni Shiit struggle gives them additional reason to delay their fight with ISIL for the meantime because of licking their future vision for what is after ISIL. The Sunnis watch very closely the PMUs and theirs actions within the Sunni territories,Tikrit, Ramadi and soon Mosul. The accumulation of all those reasons make them more distant from forming decisive decision in fighting ISIL and the more they felt it the more their loses will be. Another conflict the Sunni face with ISIL, an ideological conflict within the Sunni sect as ISIL carries a Sunni identity and was born from within the Sunnis, and that in its own a huge pressure on the Sunni Muslims, therefore, they must take an existential and decisive decision to fight ISIL. The Sunnis are thinking this decision alot, if they side with the Kurds in their fight with isil, that means they have to compromise swath of land they see as an Arab land, and if they side with the Shi’a in their fight with ISIL, they will compromise lands they see as Sunni lands. hence, they reach out to the Americans or Turkey where they can reach an agreement where they can negotiate the minimum amount of loses, a level they can agree upon.
2- What are the factors that will contribute to change those priorities?

#Iran : the Iranian influence in Iraq pushes all parties to amend those priorities, or to change them all together. The Shiit are always inclined to believe in Iran as a military power to protect them, where the Sunnis do not see that, and they see Iran’s influence in Iraq diminishes the Sunnis’ existence and influence, where the Kurds see Iran as a potential partner in this conflict.

#Turkey : opposite to the Shiit, the Sunnis find Turkey as an opportunity to bring back balance to Iraq. Undoubtedly, all parties in Iraq do not make a move without a greenlight from the outside regional powers, and both Iran and Turkey play an essential role in shaping up this conflict. Therefore, the Sunnis feel that Turkey’s influence is there to help balancing the Sunni-Shiit-Kurdish triangle.

#SaudiArabiaandArabs : what the vast majority have no clue about is that the GCC do not feel any necessity to interact with the Iraqi crisis or to reach a solution about it. Although the Arab sides are unable to reach to a solution among their countries, and they stop short when the matter is about Iraq. Even though the Internal Iraqi conflict has its ramifications on the regional Arab level, yet it is not seen as a threat to them, therefore the Arab actions and steps towards a resolution for the Iraqi crisis is very slow.

#InternationalCoalition : is the greatest chance for all parties to balance out their conflicts and priorities.

3- How is it possible to reshape the conflict with new features and less loses?

The international community is not yet convinced enough to resolve the Iraqi conflict on an international level, which delays its resolution. Most strategical studies show that the international community does not have a clear understanding of the nature of the conflict in Iraq, is Iraq affronting ISIL on an international scale, or just locally? The Iraqis failed to expose the nature of the conflict, and this failure, for sure, is one of the major factors that delays the elimination of ISIL. Once all parties come to agree that the main goal is to destroy ISIL (although it is not enough in its own), the coalition will decisively end the conflict. Yet, if all parties form a certain shape of Iraq after ISIL, that will help to eliminate all suspicions about the conflict. Therefore, the Iraqis ate urged to move forward with the establishment of the Sunni canton and gain them back for the benefit of Iraq.
When all parties come to agree upon a futuristic roadmap, then they will eliminate ISIL.

1- Grant all Iraqi minorities a clear geographical entity that guarantee them a stable and secured life.

2- Reach to an intangible oil policy among the three parties.

3- Reach an agreement upon a geographical map that will guarantee the least accepted loses for all three parties.

Every is losing in this war and only ISIL is winning it if the Iraqi continue to fall short, aggravated and incapable to reach an agreeable resolution roadmap

The coming economical crisis in Iraq will end every chance of resolution, and today’s solutions will not be effective in the near future.


“Nor do we see that any follow thee but the meanest among us” (11:27)

“Nor do we see that any follow thee but the meanest among us” (11:27)

Note: Badoosh prison mentioned here in this article is one example of the corruption in any prison where a strong presence of ISIL is registered.


ISIL doesn’t see including the despicables within its ranks as a flaw or deficiency. I was busy with this subject since ISIL and other terror groups start to surface in Mosul. I was familiar enough with the types of people joining the terror groups in Mosul. Their criminal records include, but not limited to, homosexuality, homicide, theft, smuggling, burglary, illegal weaponry trafficking and many other infamous crimes. Most, if not all of them, are well known for their infamous criminal records among the social classes of Mosul, and known as the most contemptible of all.

But those were ideal targets for ISIL and other terror groups to recruit. ISIL had many methods to headhunt those criminals and recruit them to join them:

1- Prisons:
Badoosh Prison (16 Kilometers to the west of Mosul) is one of the most important recruiting centers for ISIL. The prison was sectioned based on category of the sentences, Long term sentences, middle term and short term sentences and other sections. Each section constructed of eight large and medium chambers. There were other chambers dedicated only for highly profiled criminals with crimes ISIL itself consider them indecent. One of those chambers, which was the most significant chamber of all for them, was located in the long term and death sentences section where ISIL headquarter and Emaret center, where the Amir resides with the Imams and preachers preparation center is located, in addition to Martial arts training and fitness center. The prison Amir issues an order to transfer the graduated preachers to the felon chambers, and among the hundreds of inmates, with the protection and influence that would protect him from any assault by other inmates, this preacher is able to recruit at least 10 inmates out of every 100 inmates within two months minimum. those recruits are added to the “ideologically prepared fighters” and their names are sent to the prison wali and sends it to the linking contact outside the prison where they start to allocate monthly salary and paid to their families as they become officially members of ISIL. Those converted criminals-believers have their contacts where they invite them to their visitations to recruit them again. ISIL used the concept known as “Snowballing” in its recruiting strategy (teach 3 people, those three will teach nine people, and they will teach 27 people, and so on). This way they constantly keep on multiplying. Those outside recruits carry on different duties and orders from inside the prison, and the criminal convert believers carry on orders within the prison as well like killing other inmates, threatening police officers and their families, and enforce the prison’s security.
The number of those criminal convert believers from Badoosh Prison, who enrolled in ISIL ranks after ISIL’s invasion of Mosul, were more than 800 members.

2- Counter-Terrorism Jails:
This jail was particularly for leaders and executive amirs, the ones who order to execute terrorist attacks within Mosul, or to order to assassin and carry out tactical attacks, or to order the temporary control over Mosul every now and then. Entering this jail for those leaders was like (A voluntary arrest).

3- Police Directorate jails:
This jail was for ISIL inmates who are responsible of connections with the local police and security forces. their duty was ease weapon trade with the police.

ISIL is proud that it recruited the infamous of criminals into its ranks and changed them into “believers” capable of carrying out God’s well upon his land. Three months ago, at one of Friday mass, the preacher said about what “the enemies of the Islamic State” are saying with regards of having “the lowest of people” in their ranks and said: “But the chiefs of the Unbelievers among his people said: “Nor do we see that any follow thee but the meanest among us” (11:27) and started to go on details on the importance of joining such criminals within ISIL’s ranks by saying: A strong believer is better that a weak believer, and he brought a hadith narrated in two similar narration “For God will support this religion by the dissolute” (See Bukhari 3062 and Muslim 111).

Then the preacher started to bring different proofs about the necessity of having the dissolute within their ranks. He did not say clearly that they are “mercenaries”, instead he used the islamic term “Dissolute”, which it can be applied to the Muslim disobedient and the disbeliever as well.

This is glimps about ISIL’s recruiting process and how it handles its fighters and how to recruit them.

Why #Mosul is not liberated yet?

We published this article first in Arabic, and the comments we got were shocking and confirms about %90 of what was mentioned in the post and solidifies the disputes and conflicts within the Iraqi mentality.

We are trying to put the truth out as it is to reach to real solutions, not fictional ones.

We would like to hear from you as well and we value your opinions to see how the others think and look at us.

Why #Mosul is not liberated yet?
A Mosuli point of view

Rukimini Callimalchi, the foreign correspondent for the New York Times, tweeted on Dec. 6th, 2015, describing how close the Peshmarga were from Mosul during her visit to Sinjar after it was liberated back in December of 2015:

“Mosul was so close, were I wearing my running shoes I could have jogged there and come back”

One of the reasons that is delaying Mosul’s liberation is there is no understanding and no consciousness about the danger of ISIL existence in Mosul. In addition to the media and what it circulate about the Mosulis and how “comfortable” they are living under ISIL’s rule, which forces any power to think Mosul’s liberation over and over and over before taking any serious steps to liberate the city.

Let us start with the local security forces:

#ThePeshmerga :
The Peshmarga feel they are not welcomed as a liberating power in Mosul. The Peshmarga believe that Mosul (who chose the Arab identity to be identified with) will not welcome the Kurdish forces, and will consider the kurds’ entrance to Mosul as a new invasion of the Arab lands. This concept has its historical roots, andthr incorporation of  the Arab-Kurdish struggle has been going on for a long time.

Sinjar and Rabiya liberation were one of the main factors that established the fear of a Kurdish invasion of an Arab land. The media used the Arab Kurdish struggle broadly to deepen the rift between both sides. The Mosulis as well (as a result of the deeply rooted Arab politics in Mosul’s history) think that any Kurdish advancement towards Mosul is “an invasion”. This was manifested when the American forces entered Mosul accompanied by the Peshmarga. The American forces did not face any resistance from the Mosulis, on the contrary, the Peshmarga faced all the resistance. The Mosulis resisted the Peshmarga presence and forced them to leave some of their positions after trying to control several buildings in Mosul. I do not want to go further deep in history for a better understanding of the Mosuli history and psychi when it comes to the Kurds, the current events are more than enough to understand the conflict. Therefore, and based on Mosul’s point of view, the Kurdish forces are considered “invading forces” greedy for more Arab land. The Kurds will not be able to enter Mosul alone, because it will not find a “welcoming grounds”, at least at the outskirts of Mosul and surrounding arab villages, and not to forget to mention that the administration of Mosul township (Mosul’s administration borders) is under the Arab tribal influence for over 40 years, which has set the foundation for the Arab identity along with Sunni centralization identity.

The statements of the Peshmarga and the government of Kurdistan regarding Mosul liberation are clear since day one and this statement summarizes it all “We cannot liberate a land where its people consider us occupiers and invaders”. The Peshmarga are only few kilometers away from Mosul and they have military capabilities to fight ISIL and defeat it, yet, why they do not proceed to fight ISIL? This question is for you, the Mosulis, to answer. Ask yourselves why!

#ThePeoplesMobalization :
The Shi’a, Shiism, the Sunnis, salafism, the Muslim brotherhood, the Islamic party, the Sunni Shiit struggle, the Sunni representation in Iraq and Tikrit

The Sunni Shiit problem in Iraq is an existential problem. When it comes to the religious teachings, it become easier to fathom. It becomes just teachings dispute and protests among different religious schools. It does not only end there, just like any religious dispute during the old days. Doctrinal schools are different and they are mostly repel each other a lot, but at the end they stop at a certain boundary of connection and handling each other, and did not reach to the point of armed clash except for very rare occasions. That was very long time ago, before the rise of the ideology of sectarian conflict during the Ottoman empire, which was not in the form of a Sunni Shiit struggle, but more of a Hanafi Jafaari in most cases of the sectarian conflict.

And even if the Sunni Shiit struggle is just a straggle over power and influence within Iraq, it would have been possible to reach a resolution, and maybe there would be some common ground that all parties would come to agree on, but the matter is not like that.

The idea of (Sunni, Shiit) is embedded within the Iraqi mentality, grew over generations, and as it evolves,  millions of ideas and updates are introduced. It is “the idea” that evolves everyday into a new level, which makes it very difficult to find any connection that incorporates  yesterday’s and today’s ideas of the Sunni Shiit duality in the Iraqi mind, because within days, or even hours, thousands of views and factors come into play at any given moment. This duality is present, grows with the Iraqi human hair and nails; it has even become an essential part of the biological shaping of the Iraqi mentality, whether religiously indoctrinated or not, secular or not, even atheists, everything in Iraq is rooted within the Sunni Shiit duality.

This matter is even affecting food, just to note how diverse and deeply rooted this matter is. There is this notion between the Sunnis and the Shi’a whether it is acceptable to eat each other’s food or not. It is related to the Iraqi individual roots itself.

And upon that, the Iraqi cities’ identities were formed, upon a solid sectarian base over time. And because of  sociological changes do not manifest vividly, as it is manifested more throught practices, customs, habits, and more of the signs of social change. It is known to the concepts of sociology that change is not tangible, but it is rather a lifestyle one may live it without noticing it. One may even be surprised to learn about a certain social phenomenon within one’s society, and deny it. But the truth is, one’s nature and lifestyle have become a routine without noticing.

This is how Mosul’s identity was formed, and because the idea is concerning the existence of an armed Shiit power, the idea is more about old ideas and the existential struggle among Sunnis and Shiit. It is a way of thinking that evokes all that is mentioned before.

And what applies to Najaf, applies to Mosul too. It is not only the Sunnis, it is about the Sunni Shiit duality, it is unacceptable for an armed Sunni power with influence to exist within a Shiit social medium, and that is why ISIL was flourished in a Sunni medium while the people’s mobilization and the militias flourished in a Shiit medium.

And because of that, the Sunni extremism is not treated but only by the Sunnis their selves, and on the Shiit side, the Shiit extremism cannot be confronted but only by the Shiit their selves.

#TheAmericans :
America has suffered enormous loses in human lives,  artillery and financially during its presence in Mosul, the jihadi terrorist groups have costed them tremendous loses within a few years. It reached its peak stage of terrorism in Mosul, and the most dangerous terrorist groups were formed during this peak, where Mosul was to the international jihadi mentality considered one of the most significant cities in the world to layout a permanent jihad system. And since 2008 until 2013 (the first stage of ISIL life), ISIL was formed in Mosul and its outskirts. This city was producing in some way a form of terrorism that is based upon strict religious doctrine, based on the conception of Mosul being the last Borders of islam, or more, the last citadel of Islam in the face of the citadel of apostasy. Therefore, the American forces would think a lot before any military ground action is in place. This is not about ISIL as it is about the history of Mosul itself.

Despite what is published through media that the Turks have the capability to free their city, the Mosulis do not see it. The Turks in the Mosuli mentality are more related to Talafar. The Mosuli (Arab – Kurdish) struggle with the Turkmen is a struggle no less dangerous than the Sunni Shiit struggle, the Arab Kurdish struggle, the Christian Muslim struggle, the Arab Shabak struggle, the Islamic Yazidi struggle or the comprehensive struggle among all those constituents. In addition, the Turks are bound by a regional struggle. Turkey will not be able to extend its authority upon Mosul which will face tremendous pressure from the Kurds at its southern border, and Mosul with its social nature might become an apprehensive and frightening burden for Turkey. Turkey may only think of taking over the outskirts of Mosul, but will not risk confronting ISIL, because Turkey is aware, just as the United States is aware, that this struggle is not only about ISIL, but it is further more about Mosul itself.

In addition to all the previous introduction and illustration about the various struggles, there is another struggle within Mosul itself, that is the class struggle among the social classes in the city, the civil – provincial struggle, the conceptual struggle, the historical struggle between urban society and provincial society, the cultural struggle between the city and the country side, the absence of the political will and the social unity, the absence of leadership and the essence of initiation within the city. There is no essence of urbanism, on the contrary, there is an overwhelming religious essence, mixed sometimes with Urbanism, and the Islamic party is the founder of it. There is a Salafi – Brotherhood combat that is been escalating lately. The urban – provincial struggle took it natural and obvious form during the tussle for the governor position; after dismissing Athil Alnujaifi from his position, which represents the civil stream, the provincial stream has taken over it, and this struggle continues in accordance to their interattraction, and they will not reach to any settlement for the time being.

Now, why no one can move towards liberating Mosul?

1- There is no futuristic vision of Mosul (politically, economically, socially, etc.)

2- There is no unified front that truly represents the city

3- International powers are not convinced of the importance of liberating Mosul.

4- International and regional powers are not convinced enough to believe that ISIL is absolutely rejected in Mosul. The major misconception in international media is that Mosul does not have a problem dealing with ISIL, and ISIL’s propaganda was very influential; it painted an image of Mosul to the world that Mosul is living its “utopian time practicing Islamic Sharia”

5- The inability of the Mosulis (local Mosulis and expatriate Mosulis) to claim their city’s issues and their failure to open several fronts with the international powers to rally for the liberation of Mosul. Mosulis still think of clearing Islam’s image of what ISIL brought into it, and their mind set does not exceed the limits of clearing and purifying Islam.

6- the Mosulis inaction towards the minorities and regaining their trust once more (the Yazidis, the Christians, the Shabak, the Shi’a, etc.)

What is it required to move Mosul’s solution forward?

1- Building a civil political unified front in Washington and EU that rallies for the importance of Mosul liberation and plan a real and working program to rehabilitate Mosul economically, politically and socially, relying on the international powers to achieve this goal.

2- mobilizing the media and rally to shed more light on Mosul and write and publish about every single aspect of law fe in the city under the rule of ISIL, and focusore on children and women lives in Mosul and to convince the world that what happens in Mosul is a bloody genocide targeting the inhabitants of Mosul.

3- Confront the type of journalists who promote the idea of “Mosul is a happy city under the rule of ISIL”; media professionals like those of Aljazeera staff like Amir Alkubaisi, those type of journalists promoted an image of ISIL is an ideal ruling system.

4- Opening new dialog channels with the Shi’a in Baghdad and reaching out to Alsistani and convince him of importance of Mosul liberation and its great sensitivity about having a Shiit military force on its grounds.

5- Communicating with the Kurds and waste the chance on Alnujaifi, pushing towards convincing the Peshmarga to participate in the liberation by conducting economic agreements that satisfies both sides with fruitful outcomes.

6- Working on the establishment of Ninawa canton and develop plans to make it a success, by holding international conventions and treaties to invest in Mosul with long term contracts for no less than 25 years

If half of those conditions are met, then we, the Mosulis, will believe that liberation is possible.

And I say, without you the Mosulis, liberating the city is not possible. You need to liberate yourselves on your own. You have to give up the idea of Sunni centralization and that does not mean you have to give up your historical identity. You can hold on to it, but at the same time, you can hold the stick from the middle when dealing with crisis.

What awaits you after ISIL is far more important than ISIL itself, therefore you must think realistically to free yourselves of ISIL, for you to take the first step after ISIL.


Latest in ISIL crimes – Mass executions of the village’s men and children at Alhud Village

Mosul Eye
New crime for ISIL against an entire village
Mass executions of the village’s men and children at Alhud Village

The villagers rebelling against ISIL

After we investigated the mass execution of Alhud Village residents, South of Mosul, we were able to obtain all the details of the incident and confirm them, as follows:

Alhud Village, historical background:
Alhud is located 50 kilometers south of Mosul, within the administration limits of Alqayyara township. The village is divided into two parts, Lower Alhud and Upper Alhud and it is intertwined with the surrounding villages: Alhamidiya from the north, Azzwiya from the East, and Allazzaga from the south. All these villages are separated from the Western Borders of The Kurdish Governarate of Erbil by Tigris river where an island locally known by “Ghosts Island” or “Hawija Shikhir” is centered in the river.

After the fall of Qayyara to ISIL, ISIL started a wide range cleansing against those villages as it accuses them of apostasy and their pertinence to the local Iraqi police forces. It blowed many of their houses and executed tens of the soldiers and officers from this village. Some of them were able to flee, but many others have become victims of ISIL.

The incident’s details:
After ISIL invasion of the area, there was only one way to flee the village, and that is towards the Kurds. The Kurds allowed the residents to flee but they have to inform the Kurds so they would not get shot as they cross the river to the Kurdish side (Erbil). The river is guarded by the air forces in case ISIL tries to cross the river to reach the Kurds. ISIL was not aware that people continuously flee Alhud to the Kurds across the river. On December 28th, 2015, a few teenagers (aged between 12 to 16 years old) tried to cross the river to Sultan Abdullah village, under Peshmarga’s control. They were caught by ISIL and instantly accused them of being “spies” (they were neither spies nor have any relations with any military or security entity) and publicly executed them few minutes after their capture in front of their families at the center of Alhud.

Alhud people rebelled against ISIL for executing the teenagers. ISIL responded by segregating Men from Women and children and randomly executed a number of the village’s men. The number of executed men we were informed of was 18 in addition to the five teenagers executed earlier. Then ISIL enforced the villagers into house arrest and expelled  some villagers to other villages and declared the area a “non residential” area and considered it a “military area” and declared that everything in the village is confiscated and belongs to “the treasury buruea” (Divan Almaam). Also, ISIL detained other men from the village and removed them to an unknown location, and threatened to execute the entire village if they try to repeat their rebelling against them.

This incident records as the first demonstration in Nainawa against ISIL, and it is the beginning for more disobedience against ISIL. It seems that there is a growing  fear inside ISIL that this incident may occur again in other villages. It is also heard that several assassinations were carried out against ISIL members by individuals from the village.

The names of the youngsters who tried to run away and were executed by ISIL:
1- Taha Mohammed Matwag
2- Yasir A’gab Hasan Geddu’a
3- Said Khalid Ramadan A’ashur
4- Arkan Mohammed Attallah
5- Nazzal Yasir Nazzal


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